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Increased Differentiation or Stronger Uniformity1
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
1I.   INTRODUCTION
The overall answer to the question put to me is extremely simple: In the future the
European Union will make more use of the technics of differentiated integration. The
law of the European Union (whether adopted by the European Community in the
framework of the "first pillar" or by the European Union in the context of the "second
and the third pillar") will not be characterized  by stronger uniformity. The traditional
concept of differentiated  integration, i. e. the pre-Maastricht concept, will of course
survive. But as the Maastricht-Treaty has added at least two new and revolutionary
forms of differentiation (the derogations for the UK and Denmark with respect to EMU
and for the UK with respect to social policy), the next Intergovernmental Conference
will (and should) open the door for more possibilities of non-traditional differentiation. 
The difficult questions concern the scope and the modalities of differentiation: In what
areas should non-traditional differentiation be allowed? In what institutional structures?
Under what conditions? The following pages will try to give tentative answers to these
highly sensitive and complex questions. The answers will reflect my training and
professional experience as a lawyer; the political scientists among the readers might
forgive me the shortcomings of such an approach.
II.   CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS - TERMINOLOGY
The debate of our subject is made difficult by conceptual confusion: The terminology is
not clear and needs to be clarified. In order to simplify matters I will follow the
categorization used in a series of recent legal studies (in particular Quermonne,
Charlemagne, Justus Lipsius, Dashwood) of our subject and exposed in detail in a not
yet published thesis presented a few months ago at the College of Europe (Alexander
Stubb, The Semantic Indigestion of Differentiated Integration: The Political Rethoric of
the pre-1996 IGC Debate). More precisely I will use the term "differentiation" as the
broadest, all embracing category which encompasses the three main sub- categories (1)
"multi-speed", (2) " variable geometry" and (3) "à la carte". 
A. Stubb presents these concepts  and their multiple variants as follows: 
Categorisation of Differentiated Integration
2VARIABLES TIME SPACE MATTER
     
MAIN Multi-Speed Variable A la Carte
CONCEPT Geometry
DEFINITION Mode of Mode of Mode of
differentiated differentiated differentiated
integration integration which integration
according to which admits to whereby
the pursuit of unattainable respective
common objectives differences within Member States are
is driven by a core the integrative able to pick-and-
group of Member structure by choose, as from a
States which are allowing menu, in which
both able and permanent or policy area they
willing to go irreversible would like to
further, the separation between participate, whilst
underlying a hard core and at the same time
assumption being lesser developed holding only to a
that the others will integrative units. minimum number
follow later. of common
objectives.
VARIABLES TIME SPACE MATTER
     
3
SUB/RELATED  
CONCEPTS         
  &
GENERAL
JARGON
English English English
Two-Speed Concentric Circles Pick-and-Choose
Step-by-Step Two-Tier Overlapping Circles
Graduated Multi-Tier Opt-In
Integration Two-Level Opt-Out
Differentiation Multi-Level Opt-Up
Hard Core "Swing Wing" Opt-Down
Variable Speed "Circles of Bits-and-Pieces
Français Many Circles Integration
Plusieurs Vitesses Restrained Français
Deux Vitesses Differentiation
Intégration Multi-Track A la Carte
Echelonnée Two-Track Ad Libitum
Directoire Multi-Floor
Deutsch Structural
Abgestufte Ad Libitum
Integration Français
Kern
Harter Kern Cercles
Fester Kern Concentriques
Kerneuropa Géométrie Variable
Teilintegration Plusieurs Niveaux
Solidarity" Ad Libitum
Imperial Circles
Two-Floor Deutsch
Variability A la Carte
Plusieurs Etages
Plusieurs Voies
Variante Unionaire
Deux niveaux
Plusieurs Niveaux
Noyau Dur
Noyau Solide
Directoire
Différenciation
Restreinte
Avant Garde
Deutsch
Abgestufte
Integration
Harter/Fester Kern
Kerneuropa
4VARIABLES TIME SPACE MATTER
EXAMPLES EMU AIRBUS
Harmonisation of ESA
VAT ARIANE
Articles : JET
7c, 36, 100, 115,
130t,
Accession
Agreements
Transition Periods
Schengen Agreements
EMS
WEU
EUREKA
UK & Social
Charter
UK & EMU
Denmark & EMU
Denmark & Defence
Derogations
ERDF
ESPRIT
Ireland & Abortion
NATURE OF
CONCEPT
Supranational Supranational/ Intergovernmental
Intergovernmental
MAIN USES
IN CURRENT
DEBATE
CDU/CSU Document
Socialist "Reflections"
Herman Report
CDU/CSU Document
Edouard Balladur
Alain Lamassoure
John Major
MAIN USE 
IN HISTORIC
DEBATE
Willy Brandt 
(1974)
Tindemans Report
(1975)
Dooge Commitee
(1984)
Commissariat Général
du Plan (1980)
Jacques Delors (1980)
Ralf Dahredorf (1979)
Margaret Thatcher
MAIN
AUTHORS
Brandt Tardy Ralf Dahrendorf
Tindemans Delors John Major
Lamers/Schäuble Lamers/Schäuble Margaret Thatcher
Maillet/Velo
Quermonne
5RELATION TO
THEORY Neofunctionalism Neofunctionalism Functionalism
Neofederalism Neofederalism Realism
Federalism Federalism Neorealism
POSITION ON
INTEGRATION MinimalistMaximalist Minimalist
Maximalist/
It is not necessary to discuss in detail A. Stubb's categorisation in the
context of the present paper. My only observation concerns the distinction
between "variable geometry" and "à la carte", more precisely the use of the
variables space and matter with respect to these two concepts.
The main variable for the "multi-speed" concept is of course time. A. Stubb
defines this concept as "the mode of differentiated integration according to
which the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a core group of
Member States which are both able and willing to pursue some policy
areas further, the underlying assumption being that the others will follow
later. In other words, the multi-speed approach signifies integration in
which Member countries maintain the same policies and actions, not
simultaneously, but at different times. The vision is positive in that,
although admitting differences, the Member States maintain the same
objectives which will be reached by all members in due time".
I have no problems with this definition.
For A. Stubb the main variable of the concept of "variable geometry" is
space. He defines this concept as "the mode which admits to unattainable
differences within the integrative structure by allowing permanent or
irreversible separation between a core of countries and lesser developed
integrative units. A Europe differentiated by space goes further in
institutionalising diversity than integration differentiated by time. Whereas
integration differentiated by time defines and maintains common
objectives and goals, integration differentiated by space takes a more
negative approach in that it admits to unattainable differences within the
integrative structure. Put simply, integration differentiated by space
6considers that European political and economic diversity makes common
objectives both unrealistic and unattainable"
The main variable for the concept of "à la carte" is according to A. Stubb
matter. His definition of this concept is short: "By definition, the culinary
metaphor of a Europe à la carte allows each Member State to pick and
choose, as from a menu, in which policy area they would like to
participate, whilst at the same time maintaining a minimum number of
common objectives. This approach is focused on matter, i.e. specific policy
areas". 
While I have no difficulties with the definitions as such, I find the reference
to the variables, in particular the one to space for the concept of "variable
geometry somewhat intriguing. Is not the decisive variable in both concepts
matter (as opposed to time in the "multi-speed" concept)? Does not the
decisive difference between the two concepts results from  the degree to
which differentiation according to subject matter is allowed? In the case of
"variable geometry", the major part of Community activity and law is
considered to be unaccessible to the use of differentiation by subject
matter. In the case of "à la carte", the unaccessible area is very small or
even non existent.
However, this nuance does not affect in any way the usefulness and
practicability of A. Stubb's categorisation which I will follow in the course
of this paper.
III.   DIFFERENTIATION UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY LAW
A   The "multi-speed" concept is not per se incompatible with the
fundamental principles of the Community's legal order. In this context it
might be useful to recall the main elements of an analysis of the then
existing limits of  differentiation in secondary Community law published in
1984. In 1984 I reached the following conclusions:    
1. Whether and to what extent differentiation of secondary Community law
is allowed is a matter of interpretation.
2. Secondary Community law must conform to the general tasks of the
Community and to the more specific objectives assigned to its different
policies. Grabitz and Langeheine have shown that differentiation is not per
se incompatible with these tasks and objectives.
73. Secondary Community law must conform to general principles of
Community law. In essence, this means that differentiated applications must
respect the principle of non-discrimination. Under existing Community law
a fundamental distinction must be made between economic and social
factors on the one hand and political phenomena on the other. Economic
and social differences (both terms used in the widest sense) can in principle
justify differentiation; purely political phenomena cannot. "The fact that the
British government...is opposed to joining the European monetary system
would not be a valid argument for differentiation (provided the rules
governing the EMS were [secondary] Community law). However, if the
British pound were still in a special position compared to other currencies,
a case could be made for a derogation in favour of the United Kingdom".
The difference in treatment has to be proportionate to the differences in the
factual (objective) situations.
4. Secondary Community law does not have to respect a separate general
principle prohibiting distortions of competition.
5. Secondary Community law must be in conformity with the specific
prohibitions enunciated by the Treaty in order to establish the common
market.
6. There is no easy answer to the question whether rules which differentiate
have to be limited in time  and what are the ultimate deadlines. The two
most important factors are the type of situation which justifies
differentiation and the existence or absence of an obligation to act. While
natural differences (like climate and distance) are likely to justify permanent
differentiation, situations that are the product of historical development of
human societies (differences of taste according to the terminology used by
H. and W. Wallace) are more likely to call for only temporary
differentiation. This is particularly so if they are at the root of differentiation
in areas where the Community has a precise obligation to act in order to
bring about a certain result.
If  the "multi-speed" concept is compatible with fundamental Community
law principles, it can be used in secondary Community legislation. If it goes
beyond these limits, a special Treaty authorization is required.
My 1984 analysis did not examine the problem to what extent
differentiation concepts can be used outside the Community's legal order.
This question is addressed specifically for the regional unions between
Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg and the
8Netherlands by Article 233 EC Treaty. As a more general problem, it has to
be analyzed under Article 5 EC Treaty.
B   The concepts of "variable geometry" and "à la carte" are of course
per se incompatible with general principles of the Community's legal order.
They can only be used in secondary Community law if specifically
authorized by the Treaty.
The use of these concepts in cooperation between Member States outside
the Community's legal order is again a problem which has to be analyzed
under Article 5 EC Treaty.
IV.   THE EVOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENTIATED
INTEGRATION SINCE THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
A   The Single European Act
1.    The Single European Act (SEA) introduces the traditional concept of
differentiation (i.e. the concept as established through interpretation of the
existing Community's legal order) for the first time into primary Community
law. Article 8c SEA (7c TEU) reads as follows :
When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives
set out in Article 7a, the Commission shall take into account the extent
of the effort that certain economies showing differences in development
will have to sustain during the period of establishment of the internal
market and it may propose appropriate provisions.
If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a
temporary nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to the
functioning of the common market.
Three elements are of particular interest in the present context: 
1. Derogations must be of a temporary nature. This requirement seems at
first sight to be more rigid than what has been said above about the problem
of limited or unlimited duration of derogations. However, this contradiction
disappears if one takes into account that Art 7a establishes the principle of
the internal market.
2. Derogations must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning
of the common market. This requirement corresponds to the principles of
proportionality and minimal interference with the normal functioning of the
Community (i.e. due regard for the interests of the other Member States).
93. Derogations have to be proposed by the Commission. As the Council can
amend Commission proposals only unanimously, this requirement is a
limitation of the majority principle, which was massively extended by the
SEA.
2.    Article 100a (4) introduces for the first time the concept of "opting
out". It reads as follows:
If, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the Council acting
by a qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply
national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36,
or relating to protection of the environment or the working
environment,it shall notify the Commission of these provisions.
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that
they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and
170, the Commission or any Member State may bring the matter directly
before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is
making improper use of the powers provided for in this article.
Again three remarks are useful in our context:
1. Article 100a (4) was a price which had to be paid for the acceptance of
the extension of the qualified majority principle in Article 100a (1). Not all
Member States were satisfied that the indirect protection given through
Article 100a (3) (which obliges the Commission, in its proposals concerning
health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, to take as
a base a high level of protection) would be sufficient.
2. Article 100a (4) second paragraph expresses again the principles of
proportionality and due regard for the interests of the other Member States.
3. Article 100a (4) third paragraph shows the importance of judicial control,
i. e. the fundamental role of the Court of Justice with respect to the limits of
the "opting out" process.
3.    Article 130k consolidates the Community practice of supplementary
research programmes. It's first paragraph reads as follows:
In implementing the multiannual framework programme, supplementary
programmes may be decided on involving the participation of certain
Member States only, which shall finance them subject to possible
Community participation.
Article 130o last sentence adds:
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Adoption of the supplementary programmes shall require the agreement
of the Member States concerned.
The wording of this last provision suggests that the adoption of
supplementary research programmes is a purely intergovernmental matter. It
is therefor logical that their financing is left to the Member States
concerned, unless the Community decides according to its normal
procedures to participate.
4.    The new Title on economic and social cohesion (Articles 130a to 130e)
is of course a wonderful illustration of the traditional principles of
differentiated integration. They demonstrate that uniformity in an already
highly diversified Community (which grew to twelve Member States
through the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986) requires important
financial efforts on behalf of the more prosperous Member States.
B   The Treaty on European Union
1.   General observations
While the SEA remains fundamentally attached to the traditional concept of
differentiation - however with the important exception of Article 100a (4) -
the TEU introduces for the first time massively the concept of "variable
geometry" into the Community's legal order. Most observers would refer in
this context not only to the Protocol and the Agreement on social policy
which contain de facto a derogation for the United Kingdom (in spite of
their different legal presentation) but also to the derogations for Denmark
and the United Kingdom with respect to economic and monetary union. 
From a strictly legal point of view, it might be arguable that these latter
derogations are an extreme example of the "multi-speed" concept (of course
incompatible with the traditional limits of differentiation), as economic and
monetary union was in principle already agreed in the SEA (cf. the title
preceding Article 102a) and as all Member States recognize in the Protocol
on the transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union "the
irreversible character of the Community's movement to the third stage of
economic and monetary union by signing the new Treaty provisions on
economic and monetary union". 
However, in political reality we are rather confronted with a clear case of
"variable geometry".
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The situation is of course quite different for those Member States, other
than Denmark and the United Kingdom, which do not fulfil the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of a single currency. Their case is a typical
illustration of the traditional "multi-speed" concept. If economic and
monetary union had not been established by Treaty amendment, but by
secondary legislation, the derogation in favour of these Member States
could have been enacted without a special  authorization in the Treaty.
What is remarkable about this derogation is the special institutional regime,
i.e. the special rules about voting in the European Council and the Council,
and the composition of the Governing Council and the Executive Board of
the European Central Bank (ECB). 
In order to measure the psychological impact of the introduction of the
"variable geometry" concept into the EC Treaty, it is useful to quote a
passage from a lecture given by E. Noël at the Academy of European Law
in Florence in June 1994. According to this uniquely placed observer of the
institutional developments of the European Community, "une certaine
différenciation avait déja obtenu droit de cité dans la Communauté, sous
forme d'exception ou de dérogations plus ou moins durables. ...Il s'agissait
toutefois, jusqu'ici, de dérogations "honteuses" que chacun s'employait à
dissimuler et à minimiser. Dans l'Union européenne, la différentiation a
été la base des compromis finals et elle porte sur des questions
majeures.... Ainsi s'affirme la conception politique qu'il n'est pas possible
de contraindre un pays de participer à l'ensemble des développements ou
des renforcements de la Communauté, mais bien, par contre, aucun pays
ne peut empêcher ses partenaires d'aller plus avant, s'ils y sont décidés".
After our analysis of the SEA, it is useful to examine in some detail the
provisions of the TEU in so far as they are relevant in the context of the
present paper. Because of the number of these provisions and their
extraordinary complexity (which they share of course with the TEU in
general) the following presentation will concentrate on essentials.
2.   Economic and Monetary Union - The derogations for Member States
which do not fulfil the convergence criteria
The broad principles for the passage to the third stage are well known. Only
those Member States which fulfil the convergence criteria set out in Article
109j (1) will pass to stage three. All others "shall have a derogation"
(Article 109k (1)). The derogation can be abrogated at any time, once the
convergence criteria are met ((Article 109k (2)). The scope of the
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derogation is defined in Article 109k (3 and 4) and in the transitional
provisions of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
Even more striking than the conditions and the scope of the derogation are
the institutional consequences. Article 109k(5) reads as follows:
The voting rights of Member States with a derogation shall be
suspended for the Council decisions referred to in the Articles of this
Treaty mentioned in paragraph 3. In that case, by way of derogation
from Articles 148 and 189a (1), a qualified majority shall be defined as
two thirds of the votes of  the representatives of the  Member States
without a derogation weighted in accordance with Article 148 (2), and
unanimity of those Member States shall be required for an act requiring
unanimity. 
The Heads of State or Government of Member States with a derogation will
not participate in the appointment of the members of the Executive Board of
the ECB (i.e. the President, the Vice-President and four other members).
These members can not be nationals of Member States with a derogation. In
addition, the Governors of the national central banks of Member States with
a derogation will not be members of the Governing Council of the ECB
(Article 109k (3) juncto Article 43 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and
the ECB, and Article 109a).
No other institutional derogations are provided for by the TEU with respect
to Member States with a derogation. They are in particular full members of
the General Council of the ECB, a specific body created for the purpose of
ensuring monetary cooperation between participant and non-participant
central banks (Articles 45 - 47 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the
ECB).
It is noteworthy that according to the already mentioned Protocol on the
transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union "all Member
States shall, wether they fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of
a single currency or not, respect the will for the Community to enter
swiftly into the third stage, and therefore no Member State shall prevent
the entering into the third stage".
It is also noteworthy that Article 109 (1) provides for the conclusion of
formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the ECU in relation to
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non-Community currencies even though certain Member States may enjoy a
derogation and will therefore not be bound by these agreements (Article
109k (4). This provision demonstrates that it is perfectly conceivable that
the Community acts as an international legal personality without binding all
its Member States. 
3.   Economic and Monetary Union - The special derogations for Denmark
and the United Kingdom
As explained earlier, the special derogations for Denmark and the United
Kingdom are of a totally different character than those for Member States
which do not meet the convergence criteria: they are purely political.
Nevertheless, they are not substantially different from the derogations for
Member States which are willing but not able to participate in the third
stage. This results clearly from the Protocol relating to Denmark, which
assimilates the "exemption" for Denmark to a "derogation". But the same is
also true for the United Kingdom, though the Protocol relating to the UK
obfuscates this through complicated language.
That Member States which are able but not willing  are treated like those
which are willing but not able is far from obvious. It would be perfectly
defendable to reduce their institutional status even further. An illustration is
given by the new Protocol on social policy.
4.   The Protocol and the Agreement on social policy
As mentioned above the Protocol and the Agreement on social policy
provide an even better example of "variable geometry" than the provisions
on monetary union. It might be useful to recall that they were preceded by
an exercise of "variable geometry" in the field of "soft law", i.e. the
adoption of the Social Charter by 11 Heads of State and Government at the
European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989.
According to the Protocol on social policy the Contracting Parties
1. Agree to authorize ... 11 Member States to have recourse to the
institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Treaty for the purposes
of taking among themselves and applying as far as they are concerned
the acts and decisions required for giving effect to the... Agreement
[among the 11 Member States].
2. The United Kingdom... shall not take part in the deliberations and the
adoption by the Council of  Commission proposals made on the basis of
this Protocol and the ... Agreement. 
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By way of derogation from Article 148 (2) of the Treaty, acts of the
Council which are made pursuant to this Protocol and which must be
adopted by qualified majority shall be deemed to be adopted if they
have received at least 44 [since the last enlargement 52] votes in favour.
The unanimity of the members of the Council, with the exception of the
United Kingdom... , shall be necessary for acts of the Council which
must be adopted unanimously and for those amending the Commission
proposal.
Acts adopted by the Council and any financial consequences other than
administrative costs entailed by the institutions shall not be applicable
to the United Kingdom...
The preamble of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol and the Agreement
are "without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, particularly those
relating to social policy which constitute an integral part of the acquis
communautaire".
While the provisions on economic and monetary union grant an exemption
to Denmark and the United Kingdom, the Protocol on social policy seems
to provide a favour to the Member States other than the UK. This nuance -
which was politically important for the UK - should not distract from the
fact that in reality a derogation has been granted to the UK.
It is generally recognized that acts adopted under the Agreement are acts of
the Community (as opposed to intergovernmental agreements among the
participating Member States). It follows that the Court of Justice is
competent to interpret and to appreciate the validity of these acts. It also
follows (cf. our comments on Article 109 above) that the ERTA doctrine
applies in so far as acts adopted under the Protocol and the Agreement are
capable of generating an AETR effect. (It is however useful to remember
that according to the opinion of the Court of Justice on Convention n( 170
of the International Labour Organization, minimum rules like those enacted
according to Article 2 of the Agreement do not produce such an AETR
effect). 
The Agreement co-exists with the provisions of the Treaty on social policy.
It does not only establish new explicit competences for the Community but
facilitates also decision making in the Council by extending the possibility
to adopt acts by qualified majority. It raises therefore the question of the
relationship between the pre-existing powers (which require unanimity) and
the new powers under the Agreement (which can be exercised by qualified
majority). The answer has again to be found by interpretation. Taking into
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account that the Protocol and the Agreement together constitute a
derogation from fundamental Treaty principles, it is logical to give priority
to the use of the normal Treaty rules and to allow the use of the Agreement
only once it has become clear that progress under these normal rules is not
possible.
It is useful to note that the Protocol dispenses the UK from any financial
consequences other than administrative costs entailed for the
institutions.This provision recalls the arrangements of the SEA on
supplementary research programmes.
5.    Comparison between the derogations for EMU and those for social
policy
I have already mentioned the different construction of the derogations under
the provisions for EMU and those for social policy. There are two other
differences which are notable.
The derogation in favour of the UK in the Protocol on social policy
excludes the UK not only from the adoption of Council acts, but also from
the deliberations. This derogation goes therefore further than the
derogations provided for by Article 109k (5) which only suspends the
voting rights.
Article 109k (5) defines the qualified majority threshold "as two thirds of
the votes of the representatives of the Member States without a derogation,
weighted in accordance with Article 148 (2)". It does not establish a
precise number of votes like the Protocol on social policy (initially 44 votes,
now 52). In view of the uncertainty about the total  number of votes of
those Member States without a derogation, the reference to a precise figure
would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is however
remarkable that a threshold of two thirds (i. e. 66,6 %) is lower than the
percentage of the normal qualified majority which has always been slightly
higher than 70%.
6.    Concluding remark on differentiation in the "first pillar" of the TEU
The reader of the preceding pages might have wondered why I have
analyzed in so much detail the provisions of the SEA and of the "first pillar"
of the TEU which use the technics of differentiated integration. The answer
is simple: these provisions demonstrate that it is perfectly possible to solve
the difficult problems raised by the "multi-speed" and the "variable
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geometry" concepts. Answers have indeed be found for the questions which
I had identified in my 1984 analysis, i.e. "(1) the type of Community
activities open to 'two speed' operations; (2) the requirements as to the
participating (and nonparticipating) Member States; (3) the
decisionmaking process; (4) the financing of 'two speed' operations; and
(5) the consequences of such operations on the external powers of the
Community". The provisions of the TEU on EMU and social policy clearly
prove that I was wrong "to assume that the 'two speed' concept will never
become the subject matter of a formal Treaty amendment".
7.    The provisions on a common foreign and security policy and on
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs
Having looked at the provisions on EMU and social policy, one would
expect the provisions on common foreign and security policy and on
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs ("second" and "third"
pillar) of the TEU to have even more recourse to the concepts of
differentiation. That is however not the case.
The Declaration on voting in the field of the common foreign and security
policy notes that, "with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity,
Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous
decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision". This
reminds the reader of frequent declarations of the past which tried to
facilitate a unanimous vote by appeals to abstention. Such appeals are
however very different from  differentiation in its various forms.
Article J3 (7) contains however a diplomatic worded opting out provision
which reads as follows:
Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a
Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them
and seek appropriate solutions. Such solution shall not run counter to
the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.
More important, though stating the obvious, is certainly Article J4 (5)
dealing with security policy according to which
the provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer
cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in
the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance,  provided such
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cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this
Title.
This provision has of course to be read in connection with the Declaration
on Western European Union.
Article K7 contains almost the same provisions for the "third" pillar as
Article J4 (5) for the "second".
The "Schengen Agreement" illustrates their practical importance.
 
What is the explanation of the parsimonious use of the concepts of
differentiation in the "second" and "third" pillar? The answer results
probably from the intergovernmental nature of these pillars. Express
provisions on differentiation are indispensable for the highly structured and
stringent legal order of the Community. They are of much less importance
in the intergovernmental context of the CFSP and the CJHA.
C    Practical experiences under the SEA and the TEU
While there is no lack of practical experience with the provisions of the
SEA, the same can not be said with respect to the TEU. Preparations for the
third stage of EMU have started, but are still in their beginning. The
provisions of the Agreement on social policy have been used only once.
The practical effects seem to show that an action decided by 11 Member
States has much more implications "on the ground" for the UK than the
British government would like to see.
If this first experience with the Agreement on social policy would be
confirmed by other applications and their practical consequences, the
Protocol and the Agreement might be judged more mildly in the future than
when they were agreed in Maastricht. In this context it is useful to
remember that certain provisions of the SEA, and in particular Article 100a
(4), was considered by some eminent legal authorities as a major threat to
the established legal order of the Community. Experience has clearly shown
that they were wrong. In reality, Article 100a (4) has not become a serious
danger for the "acquis communautaire".
These few (and clearly insufficient) remarks are not intended to minimize
the dangers of using "variable geometry" and excessive "multi-speed"
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concepts. They might however prevent critics of differentiation from over
emphasising the risks which are attached to it.
It would in any case be very useful to take stock and to analyze the most
important cases of differentiated integration which can been found in
secondary Community law enacted during the last ten years. It would not be
surprising if the traditional limits (which have been recalled above under
III) had been applied more generously since the negotiations of the TEU in
view of their considerable psychological effect  on all those involved in the
Community's law making process.
V.    THE FUTURE
A    Differentiation an instrument of last resort
1.     Differentiation is not and should not be an end in itself
(Lamers/Schäuble, Martens). It is a tool, a technic used to achieve certain
substantive objectives. The provisions of the SEA and of the TEU illustrate
this perfectly.
The concepts of open ended "multi-speed" or "variable geometry" had to be
used in order to agree among the Twelve on EMU and on an extension of
the already  existing provisions on social policy (permitting to implement
the 1989 Social Charter).
The same concepts had to be used in order to agree among the Twelve to
substitute the qualified majority to the unanimity principle in Article 100a
SEA (for the successful implementation of the internal market programme)
and in certain provisions of the Agreement on social policy (again in view
of the 1989 Social Charter).
Differentiation, and in particular its radical forms (open ended "multi-
speed" and "variable geometry"), should therefore always be discussed in
relation to substantive objectives, ideally in relation to goals which all
Member States share in principle (H. and W. Wallace).
2.     As differentiation in its radical forms derogates from fundamental
principles of the Community's legal order, it should remain a solution of last
resort (Dutch and Spanish governments, Guigou, Martin, Dehaene).
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This principle is however easier to be stated than to be applied. This can
easily be demonstrated by the provisions of the Agreement on social policy
which substitute the qualified majority principle to the unanimity
requirement. A Community policy which can be adopted on the basis of the
qualified majority principle will have a different substantive quality than if
this policy had to be agreed unanimously. In other words, there is a limit
with respect to substance and quality which those Member States which
pursue a certain objective may legitimately want to respect. Radical forms
of differentiation may be the only way to achieve this.
Even more delicate is the relationship between differentiation and
bargaining for "compensation". In the case of the new provisions on social
policy this problem did not arise, as the UK was opposed to them in
principle. In other situations, the opposing Member State might be willing
to accept, provided a certain "price" is paid. Let us remember that this is
just another technic which can be used in order to obtain unanimity. The
daily working of the Council offers splendid examples for it. 
H. and W. Wallace suggest that the recent vivid debate about new
substantial applications of the "multi-speed" or "variable geometry"
concepts are a sign of the diminishing disposition of the wealthier Member
States (in particular Germany) to continue to act as the "paymasters" of the
Community. That may very well be the case. Nobody can and will seriously
contest that there is a close  and legitimate relationship between
differentiation, particularly in the form of the "multi-speed" concept, and
solidarity (cohesion). The history of the Community provides numerous
examples for this obvious and logical link. However, there may be objective
and subjective limits to bargaining and compensation. Nobody will be able
to define them in abstracto. They will only become apparent through the
political process. Member States which feel that they need more
"compensation" will refuse to agree to new substantial applications of the
"multi-speed" or "variable geometry" concepts in the Treaty. Wether the
same results can be achieved by mechanisms situated outside the Treaty is
doubtful. The establishment and operation of such mechanisms are in any
case the possible subject of judicial control (cf. Article 5 EC Treaty).
Sufficient guaranties exist therefore to prevent an excessive use of the
radical forms of differentiation to the detriment of Member States left
behind and asking for (more) solidarity. 
B     Increased need for differentiation
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1.      There is general agreement that the need for differentiated integration
has increased and will grow even further. The reasons are well known. The
Community (since the TUE the European Union) has become larger and
more diversified. The traditional fault lines between integration and
cooperation are now situated inside the Union (H. and W. Wallace). Future
enlargements to the East and the South will further increase the differences
between the Member States, their regions etc.
At the same time, the activities of the Union have moved closer to the hard
core of sovereignty and will continue to do so. In the case of EMU this is
an uncontestable economical, political and legal fact which nobody will
contest. In the case of the CFSP and the CJHA it might be more a matter of
subjective feeling. But in the realm of politics, subjective feelings are an
important part of the reality.
In addition, the consensus about  certain objectives to be achieved through
the Community/Union might have weakened (H. and W. Wallace). It has
therefore become more difficult to progress - even among the existing 15
Member States - than in earlier years.
It is my firm conviction that increased recourse to differentiation is not only
a necessity in view of further enlargements. The problem of deepening
exists already within the Union of 15 Member States. The perspective of
further enlargements highlights the problem but does not create it for the
first time. The issues debated in this paper are therefore of immediate
concern to the Community/Union and the forthcoming Intergovernmental
Conference, whatever the timetable for further enlargements might be. That
does not mean that the accession of Central and Eastern European countries
does not raise special problems which require appropriate answers. 
2.      I have stressed earlier that differentiation (in particular its radical
forms) should be discussed in relation to substantive objectives which
Member States want to achieve. What are these objectives?
It is generally recognized that the first objective of this kind will probably
be the economic component of EMU. Member States which will participate
in the third stage might very well want to intensify their cooperation in
order to overcome the weaknesses which characterize this aspect of the
TEU. This objective is mentioned here without prejudging in any way the
controversial discussions wether such cooperation might constitute the
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nucleus of a more or less closed group of Member States which form the
avantgarde of a "federal" Political Union (see infra C.).
There is also a large consensus that the intensification of cooperation in the
field of security and defence is another candidate for an increased use of
open ended "multi-speed" or "variable geometry" technics. In mentioning
this objective at this stage, we want to make the same reserve as the
preceding one with  respect to the role which such an intensified
cooperation might assume within the overall structure of the Union.
A third obvious candidate for an imaginative use of "multi-speed" or
"variable geometry" technics is the area of foreign policy. However, it is
interesting to note that this aspect of the "second pillar" is mentioned less
often than defense and security. Perhaps because of the obvious limits
which the international credibility of the Union imposes (Charlemagne,
Justus Lipsius, H. and W. Wallace).
The recent debates about Europol and the role of the Court of Justice
demonstrate that the "third pillar" - in so far as it remains outside the "first  - 
would greatly benefit from "multi-speed" or - more likely - "variable
geometry". 
Finally, there remain certain activities of the "first pillar" which might be
opened up to non conventional forms of differentiation. I will come back to
them later (see infra E.).
C    Increased use of differentiation in what overall structure?
1.     Before we progress any further, it is useful to clarify one point which
has remained until now implicit. In advocating an increased use of
unconventional forms of differentiation, we have never mentioned the "à la
carte" concept. We agree indeed with the quasi unanimity of all those who
have expressed themselves on our subject that the "à la carte" concept has
to be rejected (Commission, European Parliament, Guigou, Martin,
Lamers/Schäuble, Charlemagne, Dashwood, Justus Lipsius, Ludlow, Noël).
2.     The debate on structure has been triggered by the Lamers/ Schäuble
paper. As the Maastricht negotiations have put an end to the earlier
Community orthodoxy with respect to differentiation among lawyers and
institutionalists,  the Lamers/Schäuble paper has become the focal point of
an intensive political debate. It is irrelevant in this respect that the critics
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might not have read the paper (Stubb) or that the authors of the paper might
not have been sufficiently clear. In any case, the paper has launched a most
vivid controversy on the question whether there should be a hard core or
not.
With one exception, everybody  agrees that if there were to be a hard core,
it should be open. The exception is C. Deubner who (in his recent book
Deutsche Europapolitik: Von Maastricht nach Kerneuropa?) advocates in
favour of a closed group which happens to coincide with the
Lamers/Schäuble grouping. This might not be a pure coincidence, as C.
Deubner had sent a draft of his book to political institutions and actors at
the federal level in April 1994. In view of the overall public reaction to the
Lamers/Schäuble paper, it is highly unlikely that C. Deubner's radical ideas
will have a chance of being seriously considered; they have certainly no
chance to be put in practice. But they are at the least thought provoking.
3.     The notion of a pre-established hard core implies (even if the hard core
is potentially open) that its members commit themselves to participate in all
new and additional ventures. This is indeed the position of the
Lamers/Schäuble paper and of C. Deubners underlying study. C. Deubner
even goes a step further in excluding Member States which are not parties
to the hard core from these new and additional ventures. While the first
proposition is in essence hardly objectionable the second is of course
incompatible with the open character of the group.
4.     In the end, the fundamental question remains whether there should be
a pre-established group (whatever may be his name) which - though open -
takes formally the commitment to participate in all new activities which
deepen integration and intensify cooperation among the Member States.
The establishment of such a group would have at least two major
advantages: It would guarantee coherence (advocated by E. Noël) and it
would contribute to clarity and transparency. Both are desperately needed
to bring the Union closer to the citizen. 
5.    The potential gain in clarity and transparency would be lost if a more
pragmatic path were followed. Member States which are willing to advance
on the road of integration and cooperation would not form a pre-established
group, but would simply join as many circles as they want. It might very
well appear that some of them participate de facto in all new and additional
activities. The core group of Member States would emerge in this way
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instead of being established by a prior political act which might be
considered divisive and destructive (Dehaene).
In view of the reactions to the Lamers/Schäuble paper, it is likely that this
pragmatic approach will be followed in practice. That the structure of the
Union will not be clarified but on the contrary become even more difficult
to understand - as differentiation generally increases complexity - will be
(perhaps reluctantly) accepted.
6.     If one opts for the pragmatic approach, the question of the focal point
for intensified integration and cooperation looses its fundamental
importance. The majority of participants in our debate sees this focal point
in the participation in the third stage of EMU. Others plead in favour of a
second pole of attraction in the field of security and defense
(Catala/Almeline). It is not astonishing that the first group is close to those
Member States which are likely to participate from the beginning in the
third stage of EMU while the second group is not (or less).
D     Increased use of differentiation within what institutions?
1.      The problem of the pre-established group or the co-existence of
several circles (in which the same Member States happen to be) is
intimately linked to the question what institutions should be used for the
intensified integration and cooperation among a limited number of
countries.
2.     For its closed hard core of Member States (formed around the third
stage of EMU). C. Deubner has proposed a separate institutional structure,
situated outside the Community/Union framework, and inspired by the
Benelux organisation. The Lamers/Schäuble paper does not give any
indication about the envisaged institutional framework through which the
hard core countries would operate.
3.     The institutional problem is less influenced by the open or closed
nature of the group than by its pre- or non pre-established character. A pre-
established group suggests much more the existence of a separate steering
mechanism than the co-existence of several open circles. 
4.     The vast majority of opinions expressed on our subject plead in favour
of institutional unity (Commission, European Parliament, Guigou, Martin,
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Spanish government, Rühe, Charlemagne, Curtin, Justus Lipsius, Ludlow).
Others require the use of common institutions as much as possible (Federal
Trust). I fully share this view. The use of common institutions will
maximize the benefits and minimize the dangers of differentiation. Separate
bodies should only be set up if no common institutions exist (for instance
because the task to be performed is totally new).
I would however not go as far as my friends from the Council's Secretariat
who have expressed the view that "variable geometry" requires necessarily
a single institutional framework (Charlemagne). The cooperation of certain
Member States in the Schengen Agreement proves the contrary. I would
also take a more nuanced position with respect to cooperation outside the
Treaty, facilitated by a generalized Article 233, which Justus Lipsius
qualifies as "néfaste". This cooperation has of course to be fully compatible
with the Treaty and in particular with its Article 5.
5.     It is useful to note that cooperation outside the common institutions
has important consequences both for the democratic principle and for the
rule of law.  This is perfectly illustrated by the ongoing debates about the
Schengen Agreement and Europol. A theoretical demonstration is provided
by C. Deubner's institutional structure for the hard core: it would
considerably strengthen the intergovernmental aspects of decisionmaking
for the hard core countries.
 
6.     The respect of the principle of institutional unity requires in the first
place that Member States which want to intensify integration and
cooperation among themselves accept to operate through common
institutions. It requires however also that other, non participating Member
States accept that common institutions may be used for the "multi-speed" or
"variable geometry" operation. The best example for this technic is of
course the Protocol and the Agreement on social policy. It should serve as a
source of inspiration for the future (but not be copied, because of its rather
insufficient drafting).
7.     The respect of the principle of institutional unity could be facilitated if
the overall institutional structure of the Community/Union would be
reformed in the course of forthcoming IGC. Suggestions in this direction
have been made by J. L. Bourlanges. It is however not advisable to link
these two subjects. Each of them is so complicated and controversial that it
is preferable deal with them separately.
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E     Increased use of differentiation in what fields?
Having mentioned already the broad objectives and fields in which Member
States will probably want to progress, if necessary through increased use of
"multi-speed" and "variable geometry" technics (supra B), it is useful to
examine in more detail the areas which are candidates for operations of this
kind.
1.      The starting point is that the acquis communautaire has to be
preserved (European Parliament, Martin, Santer, Spanish government). A
good practical illustration of this principle is provided by the Protocol on
social policy. That does not mean, however, that the existing policies and
rules do not have to be reviewed and adapted to changing circumstances.
They may even been slimmed down (H. and W. Wallace).
2.     Beyond this first general principle, it is useful to stress that the
common base has to be large, profound and strong (Justus Lipsius) in order
to minimize the dangers of increased differentiation.
3.     This means in concreto that the internal market and those policies and
rules which are intimately linked to it should not be opened to non-
conventional differentiation (Martin, Charlemagne, Curtin, Dashwood,
Justus Lipsius, H. and W. Wallace). 
Policies which are an indispensable part of the single market are (1) those
parts of the common agricultural policy which guarantee the free movement
of goods, (2) those parts of the common transport policy which assure the
freedom to render services, (3) the common commercial policy and (4) the
competition policy. A policy which is so intimately linked to the single
market that it is politically impossible to separate it is (5) cohesion.
4.     Whether the same applies to social policy is a matter of controversy.
The Protocol and the Agreement on social policy seem to demonstrate that
this area may be a subject for "variable geometry". But this derogation
continues to be heavily criticized (Commission, European Parliament,
Guigou, Martin). The best answer may lie in the middle. The internal
market will not function without a minimum of social rules. But not all are
so intimately linked to the single market  that it could not work without
them.
26
5.     The situation is somewhat similar in the area of environmental
protection. Rules adopted in view of the protection of the environment
which relate to goods belong to the internal market. Provisions which have
the same purpose but which are process related do not; they can become
more easily the subject of non-conventional differentiation (H. and W.
Wallace).
Intensified integration and cooperation between some Member States in the
field of social or environmental policy can of course impose additional
burdens on their economies. As the Protocol and the Agreement on social
policy show, that is not necessarily an argument which will deter Member
States to move forward in a smaller group. In this context it is useful to note
that at least since the beginning of the eighties, the political sensitivity of
Member States with respect to distortions of competition caused by
different legislations has considerably decreased (cf. the discussions on
"competition between rules" and the subsidiarily principle in Article 3b
TEU).
6.     The most important area for intensified integration and cooperation
between certain Member States within the "first pillar" could however
encompass the economic aspects of EMU (already mentioned supra III 2).
It is not surprising that they are specifically referred to in the
Lamers/Schäuble paper and by C. Deubner. They are probably the preferred
area for innovative "multi-speed" and "variable geometry" applications in
the mind of all those who see the third stage of EMU as the focal point for a
smaller group of Member States. These economic aspects include in
particular the fiscal and budgetary policies of the participating Member
States.
7.     Compared with these heavy weight activities, few people will care
very much for marginal operations like civil protection, public health and
tourism (Justus Lipsius).
8.     While the areas for ambitious "multi-speed" and variable geometry"
operations within the first pillar (except the economic aspects of EMU) are
rather limited, the door seems to be wide open for such operations in the
field of the CFSP. Decisionmaking within the "second pillar" could be
facilitated considerably if the Member State which disagrees or abstains
would not be obliged to participate in the common action (European
Parliament, Guigou, Rothley, Rühe, Charlemagne, Curtin, Justus Lipsius).
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This principle could of course be modulated in view of the status of the
Member State which disagrees or abstains, the type of support it should
nevertheless lend to the common action, etc. (Dashwood)
The only serious limit results from the international credibility of the Union
(see already supra III 2). It might be particularly affected if the most
concerned Member State does not participate in a given activity (H. and W.
Wallace).
9.      Similar considerations apply to the "third pillar". In this sector, care
has however to be taken with respect to the internal market (Curtin).
Activities carried out in the framework of the "third pillar" are often closely
related to the free movement of people. This fundamental freedom belongs
to the acquis communautaire which is not open to unconventional forms of
"multi-speed" and "variable geometry" operations. 
F     Increased differentiation according to what additional general
rules?
The preceding sections have allowed to establish a certain number of
general rules which should be respected in all cases of differentiation, even
in their most innovative, ambitious and radical forms. Three additional
principles can be added to them.
1.     In the first place, it is useful to mention the principle of non
interference (Charlemagne, Justus Lipsius). It works of course in both
directions. Member States which have agreed to intensify their cooperation
have to respect fully their obligations under the common rules, and in
particular the acquis communautaire. Member States who do not participate
in new and additional activities should abstain from actions which affect
this cooperation. A good illustration of the non-interference principle is
provided by the Protocol on the transition to the third stage of economic and
monetary union according to which "all Member States shall, whether they
fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency or not,
respect the will for the Community to enter swiftly into the third stage, and
therefore no Member State shall prevent the entering into the third
stage"(supra IV B 2).   
2.     Groups of Member States which have decided to intensify integration
and cooperation among themselves should not only be theoretically open.
28
They should also be de facto accessible to non participating Member States.
Member States which are not able but willing to join might need the help
and support of their partners. The principle of solidarity among all Member
States (stressed by the European Parliament, Guigou, Martin, Dehaene, the
Spanish government,  Charlemagne, Curtin,  H. and W. Wallace) requires
that such assistance is made available. It is useful to note that the term
solidarity is used here in a wider sense than just financial assistance.
Member States which are called upon to help others can reasonably expect
from the latter to take all appropriate steps to join the avantgarde as soon as
possible. Like the principle of non-interference, the principle of solidarity
(or due respect for the interests of other Member States) works therefore
again in both directions.
3     The preceding sections have already given the opportunity to stress the
importance of an independent arbiter who assures that the limits of
differentiation are respected by both sides, i.e. those which want to progress
more rapidly and those which stay behind (or opt out). This importance is
underlined by the suggestions of P. Ludlow that the non-participating
Member States should accept "the majority's droit de regard including in
the final analysis the right of their partners to define their own non-
conformity as destabilising or unacceptable" and that "the Treaty should
incorporate either in relation to specific areas where it is agreed that
Member States can opt out or in articles that apply across the board
detailed provisions to deal with unacceptable or destabilizing behaviour".
Whether the non-respect of these provisions should entail sanctions
(Ludlow) or entitle Member States which are hurt by distortions of
competition to compensatory measures (Charlemagne, Justus Lipsius) is a
much more debatable matter.
It is obvious that within the existing institutional structure of the
Community/Union, the above mentioned arbiter is the Court of Justice. The
role of the Court should therefore by no means be weakened (Charlemagne,
Justus Lipsius, H. and W. Wallace), but rather strengthened.
G    The functioning of the institutions
The principle of institutional unity (supra D 4) pleads in favour of a
maximal use of the existing institutions of the Community/Union. The TUE
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provides ample illustrations how they can be used for ambitious "multi-
speed" and "variable geometry" operations. 
1.     Nobody seems to contest the principle that "those who opt out should
... have less than full rights in the institutions in relation to the business in
which they do not intend to participate" (Ludlow). For the Council this
means that Member States which do not take part in a certain policy (like
the third stage of EMU or the implementation of the 1989 Social Charter
through the new social provisions) should not have the right to vote.
In the case of ad hoc arrangements, like the one described above (supra E
8) for the "second pillar", a negative vote or an abstention would entail the
right to opt out, but would not hinder the adoption of a binding decision for
the other Member States.
The provisions of the TEU on EMU and the Protocol on social policy
demonstrate that there are different ways to establish the threshold for a
qualified majority vote if some Member States do not participate in a
certain activity. While the Protocol has fixed a new numerical threshold
(initially 44, after enlargement 52), Article 109k (4) has established a
special percentage of votes (two thirds). A third method would be to
distribute the votes of the non-participating Member States proportionately
among the participating countries. It is a matter for consideration in every
individual case whether one or the other of these methods is chosen. Suffice
it to say that they are not totally neutral, but that they may affect the weight
of the votes of those Member States which take part in the voting process.
Member States which do not participate in a certain policy because they are
unable, but which are willing to do so, should be entitled to take part in the
deliberations preceding the adoption of decisions. On the contrary, in
following the precedent of the Protocol on social policy, those which are
not willing should in principle be excluded. This difference in treatment
seems logical in view of the fundamentally different situation of the two
categories of Member States. It has however not been clearly proposed by
any of those authors who have examined this problem in detail (see in
particular Charlemagne, Justus Lipsius).
2.     More difficult than the Council is the European Parliament. As the
pertinent provisions of the TUE have shown, no special rules have been laid
down for the functioning of the EP in the context of radical "multi-speed" or
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"variable geometry" operations. In view of the increased powers of the EP
in the Community's legislative process, this absence of special rules is not
obvious. Members of the EP are of course not representatives of any
government. But they express the opinions of the citizens of their country of
origin. And it is in the end this country which does not participate in a
certain policy or which is not bound by certain decisions. I am therefore
inclined to join those which consider that members of the EP elected in a
country which does not participate in a certain policy or which is not bound
by certain decisions should not take part in the voting process. All members
should however be entitled to participate in the debates, whatever the status
of their country of origin may be.
Whether this position is compatible with the EP's request that the EP as a
whole should be responsible "for exercising control over those Union
policies which are pursued by a limited number of Member States on a
temporary basis" is a matter of interpretation, as it depends on the exact
meaning of the word "control". The EP's request goes in any case further
than J. L. Bourlanges who suggests to attribute the control function to ad
hoc bodies composed exclusively of parliamentarians from the participating
Member States.
3.     No  derogation from the general rules should be envisaged for the
Commission.
On the contrary, the Commission is an extremely important institutional link
between the different types of activities of the Community/Union, as it
assures the necessary coherence between them (Bourlanges, H. and W.
Wallace).
It is remarkable that the draft of a Constitution of the European Union
presented to the European Parliament in 1994 (the Herman Report)
proposes a different solution. According to this draft, members of the
Commission from countries which do not participate in a certain activity
would have to abstain, like members of the Council and the European
Parliament (Article 46).
4.     Even the Herman report does not propose to envisage special rules for
the Court of Justice. As has been mentioned before, increased use of
differentiation will not diminish but rather increase the need for an
independent arbiter (supra F 3). The importance of the Court will therefore
grow even further. It is useful to emphasise this point in view of the
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excessive criticism voiced recently against the Court in certain circles,
particularly in the UK.
H     The effects on the budget and on the external powers of the
Community
1.      The provisions of the SEA for supplementary research programmes
(Article 130k), of the Protocol on social policy and for the financing of the
"second pillar" of the TEU establish a clear line for the financing of radical
"multi-speed" and "variable geometry" operations. Administrative
expenditure entailed for the institutions is to be charged to the Community
budget. On the contrary, operational expenditure is to be financed by the
participating Member States alone (Dashwood, Charlemagne, Justus
Lipsius). 
The principle of institutional unity pleads in favour of the use of the
Community budget for the financing of even these operations. In order to
exonerate the non-participating Member States, a refund mechanism has to
be put in place. The refundable quote part of the relevant expenditure
should be calculated according to the percentage key which is used for the
so called "fourth" Community resource.
 
2.     Whether open-ended "multi-speed" or "variable geometry" operations"
have the well known ERTA-effect is a matter of debate. Those
commentators who address the issue either deny this effect (Charlemagne,
Dashwood) or express scepticism (Justus Lipsius). Article 109 TEU
demonstrates however that it is perfectly conceivable that the Community
acts as an independent legal person on the international level without
committing all its Member States (supra IV B 2). I am therefore inclined to
take a much more positive attitude. In order to avoid difficult problems of
interpretation, it is advisable to address this question openly during the
negotiating process.
I     Special problems related to future enlargements
I have already mentioned earlier that increased recourse to differentiation is
not only a necessity in view of further enlargements, but that the problem of
deepening exists already today within the Union of 15 Member States. This
paper will therefore not discuss the special problems which the accession of
Central and Eastern European countries raise. For a variety of reasons,
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these problems are of a special nature. They may require totally new
solutions. They are probably more closely related to the accession process
than to the general study on the increased use of differentiation within the
Community/Union.
J     The entry into force of a revised Treaty on European Union
At the end of this discussion of differentiation problems, it is useful to add
that the IGC 1996 will have to address an issue of greater importance than
any question examined so far, i.e. the provisions for the entry into force of
the revised Treaty on European Union. Like others who have expressed
their views on this point I believe that the principle of unanimity should be
abandoned and that solutions like Article 82 of the Draft Treaty voted in
February 1984 on the basis of the Spinelli report or Article 47 of the
Herman report should be retained (European Parliament, Federal Trust,
Lamers/Schäuble, Justus Lipsius, Ludlow). This is however an institutional
problem which exceeds by far the limits of this paper. It will therefore not
be examined in detail.
VI.    CONCLUSION
The preceding considerations show that the time has come to define the
possibilities of open-ended "multi-speed" and "variable geometry"
operations in the Treaty (Federal Trust, Curtin, Lamers/Schäuble, Justus
Lipsius). The experience of the last years and the discussions which have
taken place over the last months have given politicians and experts enough
material to draft the appropriate provisions which are to be put into the
revised Treaty on European Union. 
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